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Abstract: 
Two experiments examined young children’s use of behavioral frequency information to make behavioral 
predictions and global personality attributions. In Experiment 1, participants heard about an actor who behaved 
positively or negatively toward 1 or several recipients. Generally, children did not differentiate their judgments 
of the actor on the basis of the amount of information provided. In Experiment 2, the actor behaved positively 
or negatively toward a single recipient once or repeatedly. Participants were more likely to make appropriate 
predictions and attributions after exposure to multiple target behaviors and with increasing age. Overall, 
children’s performance was influenced by age-related positivity and negativity biases. These findings indicate 
that frequency information is important for personality judgments but that its use is affected by contextual 
complexity and information-processing biases. 




Personality traits are stable, internal characteristics that enable us to summarize, predict, and explain behavior 
(Yuill, 1993). For this reason, people routinely form trait judgments about others and make trait-based 
behavioral explanations and predictions (e.g., Erdley & Dweck, 1993; Heyman & Gelman, 1998). For example, 
if Jimmy repeatedly teases other children, takes their belongings, and is physically aggressive on the 
playground, his classmates may label his behavior as “mean.” Jimmy’s classmates can also use this trait label to 
predict that he will behave negatively in the future and to decide that they should avoid him. Finally, if asked 
why Jimmy taunts other children, his classmates may reason that he is simply a mean person. 
 
The way in which children reason about personality has important implications for many aspects of 
psychosocial functioning, including self-esteem (e.g., Benenson & Dweck, 1986; Heyman & Dweck, 1998), 
stereotyping (e.g., Erdley & Dweck, 1993), and peer relations (e.g., Mendelson, Aboud, & Lanthier, 1994). 
Examination of the links between these areas and personality understanding may have clinically relevant 
applications. For example, children who believe that personality is stable rather than malleable may be more 
likely to react negatively to failure, which may have a negative impact on self-esteem and the ability to function 
productively (see Dweck & Leggett, 1988). 
 
There is a large body of research on personality understanding in middle to late childhood. In one line of work, 
researchers have focused on children’s descriptions of personality (e.g., Livesley & Bromley, 1973; Peevers & 
Secord, 1973; Yuill, 1992). Generally, the findings in this area indicate that children begin to use trait terms 
spontaneously at 7 or 8 years of age (e.g., Craig & Boyle, 1979; Livesley & Bromley, 1973). With increasing 
age, the trait terms used by children become increasingly differentiated (Livesley & Bromley, 1973), less 
egocentric (Peevers & Secord, 1973), and more psychologically than behaviorally oriented (Barenboim, 1981; 
Newman, 1991). A second line of research has demonstrated that young children are adept at using personality 
trait information to make various inferences about an individual (e.g., Heyman & Gelman, 1999, 2000). In a 
third line of research, children’s use of behavioral information to make trait inferences about an individual or to 
predict the individual’s future behavior has been examined (e.g., Cain, Heyman, & Walker, 1997; Dozier, 1991; 
Ferguson, van Roozendaal, & Rule, 1986; Heller & Berndt, 1981; Kalish, 2002; Rholes & Ruble, 1984). 
Although the results are mixed, the findings suggest that only in late childhood do children come to think of 
traits as stable, enduring characteristics of people (e.g., Ferguson et al., 1986; Rholes & Ruble, 1984). 
 
Early Personality Understanding 
Although there is an abundance of research on children’s knowledge about personality in middle to late 
childhood, less is known about personality understanding in the preschool years. There are compelling reasons 
to believe that a basic understanding of personality emerges early. It is well established that preschoolers exhibit 
sophisticated categorization abilities (e.g., Gelman & Markman, 1986, 1987; Gelman & O’Reilly, 1988; 
Heyman & Gelman, 2000; Keil, 1989), and these abilities are relevant to personality understanding. 
Specifically, traits can be construed as social categories that comprise different properties (e.g., behaviors or 
mental states; see Heyman & Gelman, 1999, 2000). Thus, it is reasonable to expect preschoolers to make 
personality attributions about an individual when given trait-relevant information. 
 
Research by Heyman and Gelman (1999, 2000) supports the notion that preschoolers have a basic appreciation 
of personality traits. These authors found that 3- and 4-year-olds used trait information to make novel inductive 
inferences about an individual. For example, participants predicted that a child would enjoy a particular game 
on the basis of her personality (e.g., shyness) rather than her physical appearance (Heyman & Gelman, 2000). 
Other research (Heyman & Gelman, 1999) revealed that even 4-year-olds use trait labels to make inferences 
about emotional states (e.g., reporting that a nice child would be upset if his or her behavior resulted in a 
negative outcome for another child). 
 
Despite the apparently precocious abilities described above, children often perform poorly on tasks of 
personality understanding. Indeed, the findings of Heyman and Gelman (1999, 2000) are somewhat at odds with 
those of previous studies indicating that children do not show a solid understanding of personality until middle 
to late childhood (e.g., Alvarez, Ruble, & Bolger, 2001; Heller & Berndt, 1981; Newman, 1991; Rholes & 
Ruble, 1984). For example, Rholes and Ruble (1984) reported that 9- and 10- year-olds, but not 5- and 6-year-
olds, treated personality as a stable predictor of behavior. Heller and Berndt (198 1) found that young children 
were unable to differentiate between an actor who behaved generously (i.e., by sharing) and a control actor 
about whom they were given virtually no information (i.e., only age and gender). Given these and other 
discrepant findings, additional research is needed to examine the factors implicated in early personality 
understanding. 
 
Role of Frequency Information in Trait Categorization 
One explanation for the generally poor performance of children on tasks of personality understanding is that 
children require a substantial amount of behavioral information to engage in trait categorization (e.g., Buss & 
Craik, 1985; see White, 1995). In the majority of previous research, participants were given little information 
(e.g., one or two behavioral exemplars) with which to make personality judgments and behavioral predictions 
(e.g., Dozier, 1991; Heller & Berndt, 1981; Rholes & Ruble, 1984). Also, this information was provided in a 
condensed, hypothetical form rather than as an explicit demonstration (e.g., Rholes & Ruble, 1984). It should be 
noted that the amount of information provided was not a factor in the Heyman and Gelman (1999, 2000) studies 
because children did not engage in trait categorization per se: They were given a trait label and made inferences 
about the properties associated with that label. This may explain the discrepancy between these findings and 
those of other researchers (e.g., Heller & Berndt, 1981; Rholes & Ruble, 1984). 
 
The lack of provision of multiple, concrete behavioral exemplars in previous research may account for 
children’s poor performance on tasks of personality understanding. Indeed, the direct role of frequency 
information in personality trait categorization has been noted in the personality and social psychology 
literatures. According to act frequency theory (Buss & Craik, 1983, 1985), there are clear connections between 
behaviors and personality traits such that traits are construed as categories of behavioral acts (Buss & Craik, 
1985). Accordingly, behavioral “evidence” is needed to make a trait attribution. Behaviors that are prototypical 
of a trait, and that occur over time, will result in a trait attribution. Also, it is well established that adults use 
attributional cues (attribution theory; see Kelley, 1972, 1973) to make personality and other causal judgments, 
and frequency is an inherent aspect of these cues (see White, 1995). 
 
At a general level, there is convincing evidence that preschoolers construct causal maps that represent their 
knowledge in many domains and enable them to make predictions and conclusions about causes of events 
(Gopnik et al., 2004). For example, in one study (Gopnik, Sobel, Schulz, & Glymour, 2001), children were 
shown a novel “blicket detector” device and told that it would light up and play music only if a blicket was 
placed on it. Participants as young as 2 years of age categorized unmarked blocks as blickets or nonblickets by 
depending solely on given patterns of evidence (e.g., Block A was not labeled a blicket because it only made the 
machine work in the presence of Block B, which was thus deemed the blicket). This ability to make causal 
inferences on the basis of the detection of covariation information is relevant to the domain of personality 
understanding (e.g., see Kelley, 1973). For example, if an individual has negative encounters with many people, 
then it can be assumed that something inherent in that individual (i.e., his or her personality) causes these 
unpleasant interactions. Because preschoolers exhibit fairly sophisticated causal reasoning abilities, it is 
reasonable to expect them to pick up on behavioral frequency patterns to make behavioral predictions and 
personality attributions. 
 
The Present Research 
In the present experiments, we assessed the impact of different amounts and types of behavioral frequency 
information on children’s personality judgments. Three- to 6-year-olds were provided with multiple, explicit 
behavioral exemplars to determine whether they could make appropriate personality judgments and behavioral 
predictions. The type of frequency information used here consisted of attributional cues, because it has been 
established in previous research that these cues are used by older children to make personality judgments (e.g., 
DiVitto & McArthur, 1978; Ferguson, Olthof, Luiten, & Rule, 1984; Ferguson et al., 1986; Kalish, 2002; 
Rholes & Ruble, 1984; Schuster, Ruble, & Weinert, 1998). We examined the use of two such cues, behavioral 
distinctiveness (Experiment 1) and behavioral consistency (Experiment 2). Behavioral distinctiveness refers to 
the target behavior of an actor toward one or several recipients, whereas behavioral consistency refers to the 
target behavior of an actor toward a single recipient once or repeatedly. Thus, frequency (i.e., number of 
behavioral exemplars) is an inherent feature of these cues and allows for a direct assessment of the impact of 
this variable on personality categorization. Although attributional cues are typically presented concurrently in 
the adult literature (i.e., participants are given consistency, distinctiveness, and consensus information all at 
once), we followed the lead of other researchers who simplified the task for children by presenting the cues 
separately (e.g., Rholes & Ruble, 1984). Moreover, in previous research (e.g., Rholes & Ruble, 1984), 
frequency information was presented in a condensed form (e.g., “Sam always shares with Sally”). In order to 
give children a maximal opportunity to benefit from the cues, the information given here was more explicit in 
that each event was demonstrated. 
 
After the story, participants in both experiments were asked to make behavioral predictions about the actor to 
determine whether his or her behavior reflected a stable and enduring personality characteristic. Also, 
participants were required to attribute a trait category of “agreeableness” to the actor. Agreeableness was chosen 
because of its age-appropriate nature, that is, because it is evident that very young children have in place such a 
global, evaluative framework for reasoning about other people (see Alvarez et al., 2001). Thus, in these 
experiments, we assessed children’s ability to categorize a character according to an agreeableness trait of 
niceness or meanness (positive and negative valence information, respectively). 
 
Comparing children’s use of distinctiveness and consistency allowed us to gain insight about the emergence of 
the use of different kinds of frequency information in personality judgments. For adults, distinctiveness is the 
most powerful attributional cue (e.g., Hortacsu, 1987; McArthur, 1976). This makes intuitive sense given that 
this cue enables people to assess whether an actor’s behavior is stable in the presence of different recipients. In 
contrast, consistency is less informative because it involves the behavior of an actor toward the same recipient. 
It is unclear in this latter case whether the actor’s behavior would generalize to other people (i.e., there may be 
something about a specific recipient that causes the actor to behave a certain way). At the same time, young 
children may find it easier to reason about consistency information because it is less complex (e.g., only two 
characters are involved). Thus, the present experiments allowed us to determine whether there are 
developmental differences in the emergence of the use of the two cues. 
 
Experiment 1 
In Experiment 1, we examined young children’s use of distinctiveness information in making behavioral 
predictions and trait attributions. Although children’s use of distinctiveness has been studied previously (e.g., 
Dozier, 1991), there has been little systematic research on the use of this information by preschoolers. In a study 
with older children, Gnepp and Chilamkurti (1988) gave 6-, 8- and 10-year-olds either little information about 
an actor (i.e., name only) or three examples of the actor’s past behavior that reflected a trait (e.g., generosity). 
All children were more likely to make behavioral and trait inferences after hearing about three instances of 
behavior toward different people, although the number of these inferences increased with age. Ferguson et al. 
(1986, Experiment 2) reported that 6-year-olds differentiated between different levels of distinctiveness (e.g., 
three vs. six aggressive behaviors toward different people) in making personality judgments. However, this 
study attempted to determine in which situation children were more likely to make a dispositional attribution 
(e.g., three vs. six times). Thus, only relative differences in trait attribution were assessed. Children may have 
used a simplistic counting strategy in that the character who performed more behaviors in total was deemed 
meaner. Heller and Berndt (1981) reported that 5-year-olds did not distinguish between a control actor and an 
actor who behaved generously to two recipients. This may have been due to the sparse amount of information 
provided, as young children may require more information than adults to make personality judgments (Aloise, 
1993). It should be noted that the study of the impact of different levels of information on children’s personality 
judgments was not the focal point of these experiments and that none of these studies examined children as 
young as 3 and 4 years of age. 
 
In Experiment 1, participants heard about an actor who engaged in a positive or negative interaction with a 
single recipient (high distinctiveness) or several recipients (low distinctiveness) and behaved neutrally the rest 
of the time. Unlike in previous research, children were given either one target piece or five target pieces of 
information to make their judgments. However, the total number of behaviors seen across conditions was 
equated by including neutral information in the task (e.g., participants heard about six behaviors in total across 
the low and high distinctiveness conditions). Only the number of valenced behaviors differed across the low and 
high distinctiveness conditions. This procedure was followed to discourage children from adopting a 
rudimentary strategy to judge the story character (i.e., by simply counting the total number of behaviors). 
 
After the story, participants made predictions about the actor’s behavior toward a new recipient, as well as trait 
attributions about the actor. Overall, participants were expected to make more target-consistent predictions and 
attributions in the low distinctiveness conditions. For example, children should predict that an actor who 
behaved generously to five recipients (and neutrally to one) would be more likely than an actor who was 
generous to one recipient (and neutral to five) to exhibit such behavior again. The former actor should also be 
judged as nicer than the latter actor. This distinctiveness effect was predicted for both behavioral prediction and 
trait attribution, and we expected that children would perform above chance levels in the low, but not the high, 
distinctiveness conditions. Finally, the ability to make target-consistent predictions and attributions was 




Ninety-six children ranging in age from 3 to 6 years were tested. There were 24 participants at each of the 
following ages: 3 years (M = 42.7 months, SD = 4.1; 13 boys, 11 girls), 4 years (M = 52.0 months, SD = 3.4; 12 
boys, 12 girls), 5 years (M = 64.6 months, SD = 3.1; 11 boys, 13 girls), and 6 years (M = 76.5 months, SD = 3.9; 
13 boys, 11 girls). Participants were recruited from day-care centers and schools in a midsized North American 
city. The majority of participants were Caucasian, although additional demographic information was not 
available. Testing took place at the child’s day-care center or school. 
Materials 
A number of toy figures were used as story characters. A larger figure of an adult female served as the 
“teacher.” A variety of miniature toys was also employed during storytelling, including a marble, a ball, a comb, 
blocks, dice, stickers, toy cars, Play-Doh, pencil crayons, candy, fruit, wagons, and a juice bottle. Sessions were 
audiotaped. 
 
Design and Procedure 
Two factors were manipulated: distinctiveness (low or high) and trait valence (positive or negative). The factors 
were crossed to create four conditions: high distinct positive, low distinct positive, high distinct negative, and 
low distinct negative (see Table 1). Within each age group, participants were assigned randomly to one of the 
four conditions (i.e., 6 children per condition per age group). 
 
Participants were tested by a female experimenter. Children were seated at a table across from the experimenter 
in a quiet room or area of the day-care center or school. The testing session ranged in length from 15 to 20 min. 
After they were comfortable with the experimenter, all children listened to a story about characters in a day-care 
center or school. First, they were told the name of the actor and asked pretest questions to ensure that they could 
identify him or her: “Which one is Billy/Barbara?” Because maximal identification with the story actor was 
desirable in this situation, children heard about an actor of their own gender (see Heyman & Dweck, 1998). At 
the beginning of the story, children were told that the characters “are young boys/girls and they go to day 
care/school just like you do.” The experimenter made reference to the teacher and other toys that were arranged 
to simulate a classroom environment. The procedure then differed according to the condition to which the 
participant was assigned. 
 
High distinct positive condition. Participants viewed an actor engaging in one positive interaction and five 
neutral interactions. Thus, this condition was referred to as high positive because the level of distinctiveness is 
defined by the number of target behaviors that are directed by the actor to the different recipients. The target 
behavior is highly distinct because it is the only positive event to occur in this condition. Each interaction was 
directed to a different recipient on a different day. For the positive action, children were told, for example, 
Today at school, during play time, Billy decides to play with his Play-Doh. Billy sees Adam playing with his 
blocks. He goes over to Adam and asks him if he would like to play with his Play-Doh. Adam is happy about 
this because he doesn’t have Play-Doh to play with. Mrs. Smith comes over to Billy and tells him that he is 
allowed to share his Play-Doh with other children. 
 
This type of positive action scenario was presented once, with the shared item chosen randomly among a 
number of options (see the Materials section). Participants also heard about five neutral actions, for example, 
Today at school, Billy decides to play with his Play-Doh. Billy sees Adam playing on his own with some 
blocks. Billy takes out his Play-Doh and plays with it on his own and Adam plays on his own. Then, Mrs. Smith 
comes over and tells everyone that it’s time to clean up and go home. 
 
The items used for the neutral scenario were also chosen randomly from the same pool of objects used in the 
positive scenarios. There were six possible positions in which the positive action could occur, and it was 
presented in each position an equal number of times across children. 
 
After the story, children were given a question in which they were asked to predict the future behavior of the 
actor toward a new recipient. For example, they were told, Let’s pretend it’s the next day, and Billy comes to 
school. Billy has another toy today, and it’s a camera. Alan is playing with his blocks. Alan thinks that Billy’s 
toy is neat. What do you think will happen in the story? 
 
Children who did not answer spontaneously were given forced-choice options: “Do you think that Billy will 
share his toy with Alan or take Alan’s toy away?” The forced-choice options were presented in a randomized 
order. Then, participants were asked an open-ended trait question about the protagonist: “What do you think of 
Billy? What kind of boy is he?” Children who did not answer spontaneously were given a forced-choice option, 
“Do you think he’s nice, mean, or not nice or mean?” The order of the first two options was randomized and the 
“not nice or mean” option was always presented last. 
 
Low distinct positive condition. This condition was identical to the high positive condition except that 
participants viewed an actor engaging in five positive interactions and one neutral interaction. Thus, this 
condition was referred to as low positive because the target (i.e., positive) event is directed at multiple recipients 
and is considered to be low in distinctiveness. Each interaction took place with a different recipient on a 
different day. There were six positions in which the neutral event could occur, and it was presented in each 
position an equal number of times across children. Dependent measures were identical to those in the high 
positive condition. 
 
High distinct negative condition. This condition was identical to the high positive condition except that 
participants viewed an actor engaging in one negative interaction and five neutral interactions. Each interaction 
was directed to a different recipient on a different day. For the negative interaction, participants were told, for 
example, Today at school, during play time Billy has a snack of juice. Adam has a snack as well, and it’s a 
chocolate bar. Billy goes over to Adam and grabs Adam’s chocolate and takes it away from him. Adam is upset 
because that was his snack and now he has nothing to eat. Mrs. Smith comes over and tells Billy that he 
shouldn’t do that, and not to do it again. 
 
This type of scenario was presented once. Participants also heard about five neutral actions that were identical 
to those used in the positive conditions. There were six possible positions in which the negative event could 
occur, and it was presented in each position an equal number of times across children. 
 
After the story, participants were asked a set of prediction and trait questions similar to those in the positive 
conditions. For the prediction question, children were told, Let’s pretend that it’s the next day and Billy comes 
to school and plays with his Play-Doh. He sees Adam with his pencil crayons. Billy thinks that Adam’s pencil 
crayons are neat. What do you think will happen in the story? 
 
 
If children did not answer spontaneously, they were given a forced-choice option: “Do you think that Billy will 
take Adam’s toy away or do you think that he’ll share his toy with Adam?” Children were asked the same trait 
question as in the positive conditions. 
 
Low distinct negative condition. This condition was identical to the low positive condition except that 
participants viewed an actor engaging in five negative interactions and one neutral interaction. Each interaction 
took place with a different recipient on a different day. There were six possible positions in which the neutral 
event could occur, and it was presented in each position an equal number of times across children. The 
dependent measures were the same as those in the high negative condition. 
 
Results 
Logistic regression analyses were conducted to examine the contribution of the independent variables (age, 
valence, and distinctiveness) to performance on each of the dependent variables (prediction question and trait 
question). All quantitative variables were standardized (i.e., converted to z scores). Because they were chosen 
for theoretical reasons (see Menard, 2002), age (in months, continuous variable), distinctiveness (continuous 
variable),
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 and valence (categorical variable) were first entered as predictors. Additional predictors (e.g., 
interactions of two or more variables) were added individually to determine whether they contributed 
significantly to the model. Significance was assessed by a block chi-square test (also known as the chi-square 
difference test). In this test, the retention of each predictor in a model must lower the variability significantly to 
justify using a more complex model. The final model that resulted from this procedure was compared with the 
full model (i.e., all predictors and combinations of interactions) to confirm that it was the best-fitting model. 
Having all main effects and interactions in the models did not significantly reduce the variance of the models 
compared with that of the best-fitting model. Potential gender effects were also examined for each model. 
Because there were no significant effects or interactions involving this variable on either dependent measure, it 
was excluded from the final models. 
 
Prediction Question 
Children were given a score of 1 for selecting a target-consistent response (e.g., if they viewed negative 
behavior and predicted future negative behavior or if they viewed positive behavior and predicted future 
positive behavior) regardless of whether they answered the question spontaneously or picked the correct forced-
choice option. Answers that were not target consistent were given a score of 0. Thus, children received a 
dichotomous score of 0 or 1 for their performance on this question. The majority of 6-yearolds (79%) answered 
the prediction question spontaneously, whereas few of the 3-, 4- and 5-year-olds did so (33%, 29%, and 33%, 
respectively). Chi-square analyses revealed that the probability of answering this question spontaneously was 
dependent on age, χ2(3, N = 96) = 16.42, p = .001. 
 
The best-fitting model included age, valence, distinctiveness, and the Age X Distinctiveness interaction as 
significant predictors of performance on the prediction question.
2
 The overall regression model was significant, 
χ2(4, N = 96) = 15.75, p = .003. The likelihood ratio R2 (RL
2
; Menard, 2002) is the proportion of variance 
explained by the model, and it is interpreted in the same way as the ordinary least squares (OLS) R
2





 can be used as an index of effect size. The value of RL
2
 for the best-fitting model was .140 
(medium effect; Cohen, 1988). Table 2 presents the characteristics of the model. There was a significant age 
effect such that children were more likely to make the target prediction with age (β = .545, Wald χ2 = 3.64, p = 
.056). This was qualified by a significant Age X Distinctiveness interaction, (β = -.670, Wald χ2 = 5.42, p = 
.02). To examine the nature of the interaction, we conducted additional regression analyses at each level of 
distinctiveness (low vs. high by age). As shown in Figure 1a, the number of target-consistent predictions 
increased with age in the high distinct conditions (β = .989, Wald χ2 = 5.55, p = .02). With increasing age, 
children were more likely to make a target prediction after seeing only one behavioral exemplar. There were no 
differences between age groups in target predictions in the low distinct conditions (β = -.108, Wald χ2 = 0. 17, p 
= .733). 
 
Tests against chance (using the binomial distribution with alpha set at .05) were conducted for each age group. 
As shown in Figure 1a, responses of the 3- and 6-year-olds were significantly above chance in the low distinct 
conditions. In addition, the 5- and 6-year-olds performed above chance in the high distinct conditions. The 
valence effect was significant (β = -1.512, Wald χ2 = 7.71, p = .005). Children who viewed negative behaviors 
were more likely to make the target-consistent prediction than those who viewed positive behaviors (see Figure 
1b). This pattern was pronounced for the 3- and 4-year-olds, who exhibited greater than chance performance 
only after seeing negative behaviors. There was no significant distinctiveness effect (β = -0.165, Wald χ2 = 
0.374, p = .541). Children were no more likely to make the target-consistent prediction following five target 




The trait question was scored in the same manner as the prediction question. Children were given a score of 1 
for a target-consistent response regardless of whether they mentioned it spontaneously or picked the appropriate 
forced-choice response. Responses that were not target consistent were given a score of 0. The majority of 5- 
and 6-year-olds answered this question spontaneously (71% and 54%, respectively), in contrast to the 3- and 4-
year-olds (4% and 0%, respectively). Chi-square analyses revealed that the probability of answering this 
question spontaneously was dependent on age, χ2 (3, N = 96) = 21.19, p < .01. The best-fitting model was 
determined in the same way as that described for the prediction question. 
 
The best-fitting model included age, valence, and distinctiveness (see Table 3). The overall regression model 
was significant, χ2(4, N = 96) = 17.92, p <.01, RL
2
 =.150 (medium effect). There was a significant age effect (β 
= 0.926, Wald χ2 = 11.28, p = .001). As shown in Figure 1c, the 4-, 5-, and 6-year-olds performed above chance 
in both the low and high distinct conditions, whereas the 3-year-olds performed above chance only in the low 
distinct conditions. There was also a significant valence effect (β = 0.965, Wald χ2 = 3.84, p = .050), indicating 
that children were more likely to make the target response in the positive than negative conditions. Figure 1d 
displays the performance on this question as a function of age and valence. There was no significant distinc-
tiveness effect for the trait question (β = 0.195, Wald χ2 = 0.629, p = .428). Children were no more likely to 
make a target trait attribution after hearing about five target behaviors than one target behavior. 
 
Discussion 
We examined the impact of different amounts of distinctiveness information on 3- to 6-year-olds’ behavioral 
predictions and global personality attributions. Overall, the findings indicated that children did not use 
frequency information as expected in this context. Participants did not make more target-consistent predictions 
or trait attributions after hearing about five target behaviors than after hearing about one target behavior. These 
results conflict with the adult pattern of findings in which personality attributions are most likely to be made 
when someone behaves similarly toward many recipients (e.g., Kelley, 1972, 1973). 
 
It is interesting that with age, children were more likely to use a single behavioral exemplar to make a target 
prediction about the actor’s future behavior. However, performance on the prediction question differed for the 
3- and 4-year-olds compared with the 5- and 6-year-olds. Specifically, behavioral predictions of 5- and 6-year-
olds were highly influenced by a single behavioral exemplar, whereas 3-year-olds required five exemplars to 
make a target-consistent prediction and 4-year-olds performed at chance levels irrespective of the number of 
exemplars. This was also true for trait attribution, although the pattern was not significant. The three older 
groups made the target trait attribution both after hearing about one behavior and after hearing about several 
behaviors. In contrast, 3-year-olds were more likely to do so after being exposed to five exemplars of relevant 
behavior. These findings suggest that there may be age-related changes in the amount of information required to 
make personality judgments. In particular, in some situations, children may actually require less information 
with age to make such judgments.
3
 In support of this notion, Aloise (1993) found that adults needed fewer 
behavioral exemplars to ascribe certain traits (such as politeness) than did 9- and 10-year-olds. Indeed, adults 
may map the association between traits and trait-consistent behavior more quickly than children simply because 
they have more world experience (Aloise, 1993). 
 
Valence had a surprisingly profound impact on children’s task performance. Moreover, a dissociation emerged 
between behavioral predictions and trait attributions such that participants made more target predictions after 
hearing about negative behavior but more trait attributions after hearing about positive behavior. This latter 
tendency to make positive trait attributions about others is consistent with previous findings of a positivity bias 
in children’s judgments of others (e.g., Newman, 1991). However, the reason for the negativity bias in 
prediction and for the dissociation between behavioral predictions and trait attributions is unclear and warrants 
further investigation. For instance, given children’s aberrant performance in this experiment, it is possible that 
the complexity of this context may have contributed to the disjointed valence effects. 
 
Although children required less information with age to make personality judgments, the importance of 
frequency information in personality judgments cannot be ruled out. It is well established that adults and older 
children often rely on large quantities of information to make judgments about people (e.g., Buss & Craik, 
1985; Dozier, 1991; Ferguson et al., 1986; White, 1995), a fact that renders premature any assumption that 
frequency is unimportant in younger children’s personality judgments. Also, as mentioned previously, there 
may be developmental differences in children’s ability to use different cues appropriately as a function of com-
plexity (Rholes & Ruble, 1984). Perhaps children can take into account frequency information in a less complex 
setting that involves the relationship between an actor and a single recipient. 
 
Experiment 2 
In Experiment 2, we examined whether children are sensitive to frequency information in the more simplistic 
context of behavioral consistency. Few researchers have assessed children’s use of consistency to reason about 
personality (e.g., Ferguson et al., 1986; Rholes & Ruble, 1984), and none of them examined systematically 
whether different amounts of information affect behavioral predictions and trait attributions. Rholes and Ruble 
(1984, Experiment 2) gave participants information about a character’s behavior and then indicated whether it 
was low or high in consistency. In contrast to the 5- and 6-year-olds, children over 9 years of age used the 
information correctly to predict cross-situational stability of behavior. However, given that it was not the 
primary purpose of the study, the authors did not indicate precisely how many times the actor behaved a certain 
way. Thus, children may not have had the opportunity to capitalize on the frequency information provided. As 
part of their study, Ferguson et al. (1986, Experiment 2) told participants about an actor who engaged in three 
aggressive behaviors (low consistency) and one who engaged in six aggressive behaviors (high consistency) 
toward a recipient. In contrast to the findings of Rholes and Ruble (1984, Experiment 2), even 5-year-olds were 
more likely to predict that the actor in the high consistency condition would behave aggressively and labeled 
him as more aggressive, although only relative rather than absolute judgments were made. 
 
In Experiment 2, children heard about an actor who behaved positively or negatively to a single recipient once 
(low consistency) or five times (high consistency). Then, in contrast to Experiment 1, they made behavioral 
predictions about the actor’s behavior toward the same recipient. This enabled an assessment of the degree to 
which children require stimulus constancy (i.e., same actor and same recipient) to make accurate behavioral 
predictions. Participants also assigned a trait category to the actor. If children use frequency information 
appropriately in this context, then they should make more target-consistent predictions and attributions in the 
high than in the low consistency conditions. For example, children should predict that an actor who behaved 
generously five times would be more likely to do so again than one who behaved generously only once. The 
former character should also be judged as nicer than the latter actor. In contrast, if frequency information is 
simply unimportant (or unnecessary) in early personality judgments, then children should exhibit similar 




Ninety-six children ranging in age from 3 to 6 years were tested. None of the children who participated in 
Experiment 1 took part in Experiment 2. There were 24 participants at each of the following ages: 3 years (M = 
43.3 months, SD = 3.1; 13 boys and 11 girls), 4 years (M = 53.1 months, SD = 2.8; 12 boys and 12 girls), 5 
years (M = 64.5 months, SD = 4.4; 11 boys and 13 girls), and 6 years (M = 79.9 months, SD = 5.4; 10 boys and 
14 girls) .
4
 Participants were recruited in the same manner as in Experiment 1. The majority of participants were 
Caucasian, although additional demographic information was not available. 
 
Materials 
The materials used were identical to those used in Experiment 1. 
 
Design and Procedure 
Two factors were manipulated: trait valence (positive or negative) and consistency (low or high). The factors 
were crossed to create four conditions: high consistency positive, low consistency positive, high consistency 
negative, and low consistency negative (see Table 1). In contrast to distinctiveness, consistency refers to the 
target behavior of an actor toward only one recipient, either once only (low consistency) or five times (high 
consistency). Within each age group, participants were assigned randomly to one of the four conditions (i.e., 6 
children per condition per age group). 
 
High consistency positive condition. Children viewed an actor who performed five positive actions and one 
neutral action toward a single recipient. The positive and neutral scenarios were identical to those in Experiment 
1 except that the behaviors were directed to one recipient rather than multiple recipients. After the story, 
children were asked prediction and trait questions as in Experiment 1. However, for the prediction question in 
this experiment, participants were asked to predict the future behavior of the protagonist toward the same 
recipient. For example, children were told 
 
Let’s pretend that it’s the next day, and Billy comes to school. Billy has another toy today, and 
it’s a wagon. Adam is playing with his blocks. Adam thinks that Billy’s toy is neat. What do you 
think will happen in the story? 
 
If children did not answer spontaneously, they were given a forced-choice option: “Do you think that Billy will 
share his toy with Adam or do you think he’ll take Adam’s toy away?” Participants were asked the same trait 
question about the protagonist as in Experiment 1 (“What do you think of Billy? What kind of boy is he?”) and 
were offered the same forced-choice options as those presented in Experiment 1 (“Do you think that he’s nice, 
mean, or not nice or mean?”). 
 
Low consistency positive condition. This condition was identical to the high positive condition except that 
children heard about only one positive action (chosen among those presented in the high positive condition) and 
five neutral actions (identical to those presented in the high positive condition, with a variety of objects) toward 
the recipient. The dependent measures were the same as those in the high positive condition. 
 
High consistency negative condition. This condition was identical to the high consistency positive condition 
except that children heard about five negative actions and a single neutral action toward the recipient. After the 
story, participants were asked a set of prediction and trait questions similar to those in the positive conditions. 
For the prediction question, children were told, 
 
Let’s pretend that it’s the next day and Billy comes to school and plays with his Play-Doh. He 
sees Adam with his pencil crayons. Billy thinks that Adam’s pencil crayons are neat. What do 
you think will happen in the story? 
 
If children did not answer spontaneously, they were given a forced-choice option: “Do you think that Billy will 
take Adam’s toy away or do you think that he’ll share his toy with Adam?” Finally, children were asked the 
same trait question that was presented in the positive conditions. 
 
Low consistency negative condition. Children were presented with one negative action (among those presented 
in the high negative condition) and five neutral actions (identical to those presented in the high negative 
condition, with a variety of objects) toward one recipient. Each action occurred on a different day. Dependent 
measures were the same as those in the high negative condition. 
 
Results 
As in Experiment 1, logistic regression analyses were conducted to examine the contribution of the independent 
variables (age, valence, and consistency) to performance on the dependent variables (prediction and trait 




Children’s responses were scored in the same way as in Experiment 1. Participants received a score of 1 for a 
target-consistent response regardless of whether they responded spontaneously or by forced choice. Answers 
that were not target consistent were given a score of 0. Fifty-four percent of 6-year-olds, 58% of 5-year-olds, 
46% of 4-year-olds, and 42% of 3-year-olds answered this question spontaneously. Chi-square analyses 
revealed that these differences did not depend on age, χ2(3, N = 96) = 1.667, p = .644. 
 
As shown in Table 4, the best-fitting model included age, valence, consistency, and the Age X Valence 
interaction as significant predictors of performance on the prediction question. The overall regression model 
was significant, χ2(4, N = 96) = 13.78, p = .008, RL
2
 = .117 (small effect). The consistency effect was significant 
such that children who heard about five target behaviors were more likely to make the target-consistent 
prediction than were those who heard about one target behavior (β = 0.611, Wald χ2 = 5.87, p = .015). As shown 
in Figure 2a, the responses of 3- and 4-year-olds did not differ significantly from chance in the low or high 
consistency conditions. In contrast, 5- and 6-year-olds scored significantly above chance in the high, but not the 
low, consistency conditions. There was no significant valence effect (β = -0.601, Wald χ2 = 1.53, p = .216). 
Children’s predictions did not differ on the basis of viewing positive or negative behaviors. However, the Age 
X Valence interaction was significant (β = 1.056, Wald χ2 = 4.34, p = .037). To examine this further, we 
conducted additional regression analyses for each level of valence (positive vs. negative) as a function of age. 
With increasing age, children were more likely to make the target prediction when hearing about positive 
behavior (β = 0.753, Wald χ2 = 4.51, p = .03). In contrast, there were no significant age-related changes in 
target predictions for negative behavior (β = -0.176, Wald χ2 = 0.284, p = .594). Four- and 5-year-olds 
performed significantly above chance in the negative valence conditions. In contrast, the 6-year-olds performed 
above chance in the positive valence conditions. Figure 2b shows the proportion of children who chose the 
target response as a function of valence. Finally, the age effect was not significant for this measure (β = -0.201, 




The trait question was scored in the same way as the prediction question. Children were given a score of 1 for a 
target-consistent response regardless of whether they mentioned it spontaneously or picked the correct forced-
choice option. Answers that were not target consistent were given a score of 0. The majority of 6-yearolds 
(58%) answered this question spontaneously, in contrast to 29% of 5-year-olds, 50% of 4-year-olds, and 21% of 
3-year-olds. Chi-square analyses revealed that the differences were associated with age, χ2(3, N = 96) = 8.912,  
p = .03. 
 
As shown in Table 5, the best-fitting model included age, valence, consistency, and the Valence X Consistency 
interaction. The overall regression model was significant, χ2(4, N = 96) _ 25.35, p < .01, RL
2
 = .240 (medium 
effect). There was also a significant age effect (β = 0.668, Wald χ2 = 4.75, p = .029). A significant consistency 
effect was obtained such that participants were more likely to make a target attribution after hearing about five 
target behaviors than after hearing about one target behavior (β = 1.797, Wald χ2 = 9.99, p = .002). As shown in 
Figure 2c, all age groups responded significantly above chance in the high consistency conditions. The 4-, 5-, 
and 6-year-olds’ responses were also significantly greater than chance in the low consistency conditions. There 
was no significant valence effect (β = 0.150, Wald χ2 = 0.049, p = .825). Children’s attributions did not differ as 
a function of hearing about positive or negative behavior (see Figure 2d). However, as shown in Figure 3, there 
was a significant Consistency X Valence interaction (β = -1.392, Wald χ2 = 4.05, p = .044). To assess the nature 
of the interaction, we conducted additional regression analyses at each level of valence (positive and negative). 
Participants’ attributions of positivity were similar regardless of hearing about five instances or one instance of 
positive behavior (β = 0.348, Wald χ2 = 0.801, p = .371). In contrast, participants who heard about five negative 
behaviors were more likely to make a negative attribution than were those who heard about one negative 































In contrast to Experiment 1, participants differentiated their personality judgments on the basis of the amount of 
consistency information provided. These results challenge the notion that with age children require less 
frequency information to reason about personality. Overall, participants who viewed five target behaviors were 
more likely to predict corresponding behavior than were those who viewed one target behavior. Also, children 
were more likely to make the target trait attribution when given many behavioral exemplars. These findings 
emphasize the influence of the amount of information on children’s ability to make personality judgments, a 
variable that has not been investigated systematically in previous research. 
 
As in Experiment 1, there were age-related differences in performance. Three-year-olds were more likely to 
make the target trait attribution only after hearing about five target behaviors, which suggests that they require 
large amounts of explicit behavioral frequency information to make trait judgments. In contrast, the 4-, 5-, and 
6-year-olds tended to make the target trait attribution irrespective of hearing about one or five target behaviors. 
Thus, beyond the age of 3 years, children appear to attribute a trait label readily to an actor even in the face of 
little information. It is important to note, however, that the willingness to label an actor on the basis of a single 
behavior did not transfer to the prediction question for any of the age groups. 
 
 
Indeed, 3- and 4-year-olds performed at chance levels irrespective of frequency, whereas the 5- and 6-year-olds 
exhibited greater than chance performance only after exposure to multiple target behaviors. The performance of 
older children on the prediction question indicates that they used multiple pieces of information to predict 
cross-situational stability of behavior, and thus they appear to appreciate the actor’s behavior as a reflection of a 
stable and enduring trait. Moreover, the fact that these children made the target prediction only after hearing 
about multiple behaviors adds further support for the role of frequency information in personality judgments. 
 
Finally, in contrast to Experiment 1, there was no overall valence effect on children’s behavioral predictions, 
and there was no dissociation between behavioral predictions and trait attributions. Participants tended to make 
a positive trait attribution whether they viewed one or five positive behaviors, yet they were reluctant to 
attribute a negative trait to the actor unless they had substantial behavioral evidence (i.e., five negative 
exemplars). This is consistent with the overall positivity bias seen in Experiment 1 and is addressed further in 
the General Discussion. 
 
General Discussion 
The present research is the first to investigate systematically the effect of frequency information on young 
children’s personality judgments. In Experiments 1 and 2, we examined the effect of different quantities of 
distinctiveness and consistency information, respectively, on children’s behavioral predictions and trait attribu-
tions. These experiments also allowed for an assessment of developmental differences in the use of these 
attributional cues as a function of their complexity. The results provide valuable information about the role of 
frequency in young children’s emergent understanding of personality. The findings of Experiment 1 indicate 
that participants were insensitive to different amounts of distinctiveness information and readily made trait 
inferences and predictions on the basis of a single behavior. Thus, the number of behavioral exemplars had little 
effect on children’s personality judgments in this context. In contrast, the findings of Experiment 2 revealed that 
children were indeed sensitive to different amounts of consistency information. The latter finding demonstrates 
that the provision of multiple behavioral exemplars enables very young children to make appropriate trait 
attributions and behavioral predictions in situations where they otherwise fail to do so. Across studies, valence 
had a surprisingly large impact on personality judgments. On the basis of these results, it is clear that reasoning 
about personality depends on the interaction of at least three factors: the quantity, complexity, and valence of 
information. 
 
Impact of Quantity and Type of Information on Personality Judgments 
Our findings indicate that the quantity of information available has a considerable impact on children’s 
personality judgments. Moreover, these results may explain the discrepancy in previous data regarding young 
children’s ability to make judgments about people. For example, in contrast to the findings of Ferguson et al. 
(1986), Rholes and Ruble (1984) reported that 5- and 6-year-olds could not make cross-situational behavioral 
predictions. However, Ferguson et al. (1986) provided more behavioral information (i.e., exemplars) than did 
Rholes and Ruble (1984), and this may account for the discrepant results across these studies. As shown in 
Experiment 2, young children require multiple, explicit exemplars to reason about personality, whereas older 
children and adults may not (see Aloise, 1993). 
 
Although frequency is important for personality judgments, it alone does not account for these findings. 
Children were given the same number of behavioral exemplars across experiments, but they responded 
differently depending on the context in which the exemplars occurred. Indeed, in Experiment 1, participants 
over 3 years of age apparently required very little behavioral information to make trait attributions and 
behavioral predictions. This finding raises the possibility that with age children actually require less information 
and instead make snap judgments about people, as adults do in some situations (see Kunda & Thagard, 1996). 
These judgments can take form via the automatic processing of behavioral information that is concurrently 
linked with a trait label that is chronically accessible (e.g., see Bargh, 1982; Bargh & Thein, 1985) or via 
spontaneous formation of an impression, with little awareness of the context (e.g., Winter & Uleman, 1984). For 
the 4-, 5-, and 6-year-olds, good and bad behaviors to which they are chronically exposed (e.g., on the 
playground) may automatically evoke trait inferences. 
 
On the basis of these findings, however, it is unlikely that with age preschoolers simply require less information 
to reason about personality. First, as mentioned previously, older children and adults often require high 
frequency information to reason about behavior (e.g., Kelley, 1973; White, 1995). Second, if children in the 
present studies made automatic judgments of niceness or meanness, then the same pattern of results should have 
been obtained across experiments. In our view, a more parsimonious interpretation of the data is that children 
require frequency information to make personality judgments but that the appropriate use of it is limited to 
simplistic contexts (i.e., consistency rather than distinctiveness). In particular, children failed to differentiate 
their judgments in Experiment 1 not because they required little information but because they could not use 
distinctiveness appropriately. This interpretation is consistent with the work of Rholes and Ruble (1984), who 
suggested that the use of consistency emerges prior to the use of distinctiveness information in personality 
judgments. 
 
There are at least two reasons why the use of consistency may precede the use of distinctiveness in making 
personality judgments. First, in the context of consistency, children can rely on stimulus constancy (i.e., same 
actor and recipient) to make their judgments rather than on personality dispositions per se (Rholes & Ruble, 
1984). In contrast, for distinctiveness, they must attend to an actor’s behavior toward multiple recipients. There 
may be a developmental progression in which children first require stimulus constancy and only at a later age 
are able to reason about the direct role of traits in behavior. Although speculative, these results may underscore 
limitations in children’s causal reasoning abilities in the social realm (see Ferguson et al., 1984). In particular, 
appropriate use of distinctiveness requires sensitivity to covariation information. Children must reason that the 
actor is the cause of the outcome in the low distinctiveness conditions because it is the actor’s target behavior 
that is largely constant (whereas the recipients change). In the high distinctiveness conditions, children must 
resist reaching the same conclusion because the actor’s target behavior is directed to only one recipient, 
rendering it difficult to make a decision about the cause of the behavior (e.g., it could be due to a bad dynamic 
between the actor and one individual rather than to the actor’s personality). These kinds of causal inferences 
may be too complex for preschoolers, who may have resorted to the adoption of a matching strategy (e.g., 
judging that the actor is nice or mean on the basis of the outcome of the behavior without taking into account 
the frequency information; see White, 1995; Yuill & Pearson, 1998) and hence treated the low and high distinct 
conditions equally (but see Gopnik et al., 2001, 2004, for evidence of sophisticated causal understanding in 
preschoolers). 
 
Second, there are greater information-processing demands in the context of distinctiveness information. This 
may have resulted in a breakdown of performance at different levels. It is well known that young children are 
captivated by variety in stimuli, which results in an inability to attend selectively to relevant information in an 
array (e.g., see Miller & Weiss, 1981). The participants in Experiment 1 may have been so highly attuned to the 
presence of multiple recipients that they failed to notice that the frequency of the target information differed 
across the low and high distinct conditions (i.e., they failed to distinguish between recipients who received 
neutral behaviors and those who received target behaviors). In contrast, participants did not have difficulty 
differentiating between the low and high consistency conditions. Note that the sole difference between the high 
distinct and low consistency conditions was the presence of multiple recipients in the former condition. Thus, it 
is clear that this contextual factor had a profound impact on the way in which children treated the same 
frequency information. Finally, it is possible that children’s performance deteriorated because they could not 
integrate individual pieces of information into a cohesive impression of the actor (see Rholes & Ruble, 1986). 
That is, participants may not have recognized the relation between the individual “units” of interaction between 
the actor and each recipient. Indeed, previous research suggests that children experience difficulty integrating 
variants of a class of information (e.g., Rholes & Ruble, 1986; Sloutsky, 2003; see Smith, 2002.). For example, 
Rholes and Ruble (1986) reported that children were unable to integrate instances of positive and negative 
information over several days. 
 
Taken together, these findings indicate that both the quantity and the type of frequency information (i.e., level 
of complexity) are implicated in young children’s ability to reason about personality. Children learn about the 
characteristics of other people by noticing patterns in their behavior. However, there also appears to be a 
developmental progression such that the use of consistency emerges prior to the use of distinctiveness 
information in reasoning about personality. Additional research is needed to determine precisely why children 
have difficulty processing distinctiveness information appropriately. For example, the salience of the actor’s 
behavior could be increased to assess whether it would enable children to differentiate low and high 
distinctiveness conditions. 
 
Role of Valence in Personality Judgments 
Across experiments, valence had a substantial impact on children’s impressions of the actor. Overall, children 
exhibited a positivity bias in both their personality judgments and behavioral predictions, and this was 
particularly evident for consistency information. Participants’ behavioral predictions became increasingly 
positive between the ages of 3 and 6 years, and children tended to make positive trait attributions regardless of 
hearing about one or many positive behaviors. In contrast, they were reluctant to make negative trait attributions 
after hearing about one negative behavior and only did so after several negative behaviors, thus giving the actor 
the benefit of the doubt and attributing niceness, but not meanness, on the basis of a single behavior. The 
findings of a positivity bias are consistent with research indicating that children tend to overattribute favorable 
characteristics to people (e.g., Drozda-Senkowska, 1990; Heyman & Giles, 2004; Stipek & Daniels, 1990). For 
example, Stipek and Daniels (1990) found that kindergartners who were given positive information about a 
classmate (e.g., that he or she was smart) wrongly ascribed other positive qualities to that classmate (e.g., good 
athletic abilities). The presence of a positivity bias may foster adaptive development. For example, a positive 
attitude toward peers encourages the formation of friendships and social competence (e.g., Coie, Dodge, & 
Kupersmidt, 1990; Ladd & Price, 1987). 
 
The positivity bias was notably less prominent for distinctiveness information. As with consistency, children 
were more likely to make the target trait attribution after seeing positive behaviors, but their behavioral 
predictions were more sensitive to negative information. Visual inspection of the data seems to indicate that this 
dissociation was largely driven by the 3- and 4-year-olds. In contrast, by 6 years of age, children’s trait 
attributions and behavioral predictions tended to be compatible. It is unclear why there was a dissociation in 
valence effects between the predictions and attributions for the younger participants in Experiment 1. One 
possibility is that unlike adults, young children do not appreciate the correspondence between traits and trait-
consistent behavior (see Aloise, 1993). Although the valence effects did not reach significance in Experiment 2, 
the same pattern of a dissociation between predictions and attributions was seen in the younger children, only to 
attenuate substantially by the time the children were 6 years of age. Because it was significant only in 
Experiment 1, another possibility is that the dissociation was an artifact of task complexity, although it is 
unclear how exactly this might have been the case. Neither of these options explains why negative information 
may be highly salient to preschoolers in some contexts. It is possible that young children possess a global 
negativity bias (see Nelson, 1980) that decreases with age but that they are reluctant to label another person 
negatively, thus creating the dissociation between predictions and attributions. However, this seems unlikely 
given that the current findings, as well as previous research, point to an overall positivity bias in personality 
judgments (see Heyman & Giles, 2004). Clearly, additional research will be required to address these 
preliminary findings of valence effects on early personality understanding. 
 
Limitations, Future Directions, and Conclusion 
This research provides a springboard for future inquiry into children’s understanding of personality. First, it is 
important to examine the degree to which children can integrate different types of behavioral exemplars to form 
a trait category. Our findings suggest that fairly minor variations in exemplars (i.e., different recipients) have a 
profound influence on personality judgments, and the ability to integrate different exemplars may increase as a 
function of trait type and age. Second, the valence effects obtained here warrant further study, as the presence of 
biases at this very early age has implications in a number of arenas, such as stereotyping and peer relations. In 
particular, it is unclear under what circumstances children are likely to exhibit positivity or negativity biases. It 
is important to examine children’s treatment of valence information as a function of both information type and 
task setting as well as to determine what children believe about the link between traits and behaviors. Future 
research on the influence of valence in personality understanding has the additional challenge of controlling for 
potential effects of prototypicality, which refers to the degree to which a given behavior is representative of a 
trait (see Mervis & Rosch, 1981). In our research, it was unclear whether sharing and taking are equally 
prototypical of the traits “nice” and “mean,” respectively. Thus, the overall positivity bias obtained here may be 
due to prototypicality rather than to a positivity bias per se. 
 
Third, it is crucial to provide children with plausible response options from which to choose in tasks of 
personality understanding. Many children in these studies required a forced-choice option for the prediction 
question, and they may have been constrained by the absence of a neutral option. In particular, children in the 
low frequency conditions (i.e., high distinctiveness and low consistency) could not choose the most frequent 
behavior (neutral), because it was not presented. Thus, they may have been biased to choose the target response 
(because it was familiar) or the alternate response (because it was novel). This is unlikely to have happened here 
given that (a) there was little evidence of systematic group biases in these conditions (children tended to 
respond at chance levels) and (b) it is unlikely that children would exhibit opposing biases across experiments, 
as would be the case here given that children tended to make the target-consistent response in the high 
distinctiveness, but not the low consistency, conditions. Nonetheless, this is an important issue that needs to be 
addressed in the future to obtain an accurate picture of how children conceptualize people. 
 
In sum, the present research adds to a growing body of literature on impression formation at an early age. In 
particular, our findings draw attention to the important and complex role of frequency information in young 
children’s personality attributions and behavioral predictions. Additional research is needed on the interaction 
of different factors including frequency, mental states such as emotions, desires, and intentions (see Kalish, 
2002; Yuill & Pearson, 1998), task complexity, and information-processing biases to determine how these 





 Analyses were also conducted using distinctiveness as a categorical variable (low vs. high), and these analyses 
yielded the same pattern of results.
 
2
 Note that not all predictors within a best-fitting model may be significant. However, the three main variables 
in these analyses (age, valence, and distinctiveness) were chosen for theoretical reasons and were thus retained 
as part of the model regardless of their statistical significance. 
3
 We thank an anonymous reviewer for this suggestion. 
4
 The precise ages in months for 3 children (one 4-year-old, one 5-yearold, and one 6-year-old) were unknown, 
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